Convenors: Matias Petersen (Kings College London) and Kaveh Pourvand (London School of Economics)
The morality of markets and their ethical limits continue to generate significant debate
within political theory. Are there things that should not be for sale? Debra Satz and other
scholars answer affirmatively. On their view, certain goods are simply not appropriate
objects of commodification and market exchange. Moreover, the over-reach of markets
can crowd-out other valuable modes of human interaction. Jason Brennan and Peter
Jaworski, meanwhile, have argued for fewer limits. Any good that can be gifted
legitimately can likewise also be sold, on their view. The question of what limits there
should be to market exchange and how these may be demarcated is the central one to be
addressed in our workshop. This is a broad question, however, and raises other interrelated issues. We would also look to accept papers addressing questions such as the following:
1. What does experimental/behavioural economics say about the crowding-in and
crowding-out effects of marketisation, and what are the normative implications of
that body of research?
2. Can the free-market be a site of deliberative discourse? Critics of markets fear that
at most they meet the bare preferences of people as consumers rather than
encourage them to gain informed or considered preferences through democratic
deliberation. Defenders of markets, meanwhile, argue that they can be a source of
moral progress in creating scope for Millian experiments in living and co-ordinating
dispersed information, while suggesting that deliberation about common goods in
large-scale political communities faces insurmountable coordination and knowledge
3. To what extent can the moral questions raised by various social relationships be
addressed by the notion of consent? Libertarians sometimes suggest that as long as
social relations are consensual in the relevant sense, they need not create any
other moral concerns, even if, for example, there are substantial asymmetries of
power between parties. On the other hand, critics of markets wish to forbid all
manner of human activities even if they are subject to the consent of informed and
willing parties. What kind of moral theory is required for advancing the thesis that
consent is not enough for justifying a contractual relationship?
4. What is the best normative justification of markets? A standard answer is that
markets allow people with differing ends to peaceably and productively cooperate
without mandating agreement. These are “subjectivist” justifications insofar as
they are concerned with individual preference satisfaction without comment on
the nature of those preferences. But can we justify markets on more objective or
substantive grounds, that they promote the virtues for instance? Are there good
deontological and/or natural rights justifications of markets?
To apply please send a 500 word abstract to firstname.lastname@example.org. Please include in your email your name, institutional affiliation, paper title and abstract. The application deadline is Friday 18th May. Please attach your abstract as a separate, anonymous document suitable for blind review. Notices for acceptance will be sent by 15 June, enabling those who are eligible to apply for bursaries. (See below.)
Please note that as a presenter at this workshop you will need to register for the MANCEPT workshops. The registration fees are £230.00 for academics and £135.00 for graduate students and retirees. Registration will open in May.
Graduate students, early-career researchers, and retirees whose papers have been accepted may apply for bursaries. The deadline for this is Saturday 23rd June and successful applicants will be notified by Monday 25th June. Further information will be published on the MANCEPT website (http://www.mancept.com/mancept-workshops/mancept-workshops-2018-3/) closer to the date.